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Abstract—Search engines get revenue thanks to adword auc-
tions, where commercial links are proposed and charged to
advertisers as soon as the link is clicked through. Most search
engines have chosen (or switched to) a revenue-based ranking
and charging scheme instead of a bid-based one. We investigate
here the relevance of that scheme when advertisers’ valuation
comes from a random distribution. We show that, depending on
the search engine’s click-through-rate, revenue-based does not
always outperform bid-based in terms of revenue to the search
engine. As a result, some search engines may have an interest to
move to revenue-based ranking while others do not.
I. INTRODUCTION
Search engines are a key piece for web-browsing, allowing
to easily find relevant web sites corresponding to given key-
words. An important characteristic of their success, in addition
to their efficiency, is that this service is free. In order to
get a return on investment, search engines propose slots for
commercial links to advertisers interested in specific keywords
[1]. Those slots are allocated thanks to an auction scheme,
hence the terminology adword auction.
There are usually a given number K of slots, ordered
according to their visibility on the screen. Advertisers submit
bids for specific keywords and each time there is a search
on that keyword, advertisers are ranked and slots allocated
according to a specific criterion: they can for instance be
ranked according to their bid value, or by the revenue they can
generate (this will be made clearer later). Advertisers may be
charged each time their ad is displayed (scheme called Pay-
Per-Impression), each time the ad is clicked (scheme called
Pay-Per-Click), or each time the click results in a real sale
(called Pay-Per-Transaction). The amount of money to be
charged each time can be chosen among several possibilities:
• the first-price principle, where advertisers pay their bid,
• the so-called Generalized Second Price (GSP), where they
pay
– the bid of the advertiser just below them in the
ranking if the ranking strategy is based on bids;
– or the price such that the revenue generated corre-
sponds to the (declared) one the advertiser below
them if the ranking is based on revenue.
• Another option is to make use of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) auctions: each advertiser pays the opportunity cost
that its presence introduces to all other advertisers.
For more on adword auction description, the reader can look
at [2], [3], [4], [5] and the references therein.
The commonly used strategies are Pay-Per-Click and GSP
[2]. Though, there used to be some differences about the
ranking strategy procedure used. While bid-based ranking was
initially implemented by Yahoo!, Google has introduced a
revenue-based ranking, ordering according to the value of the
product of the bid by the Click-Through-Rate (CTR), which is
the probability that the ad is clicked when displayed. Recently,
Yahoo! has changed its ranking policy to a revenue-based one
too.
Our goal in this paper is to investigate the best ranking
strategy for search engines when Pay-Per-Click and GSP are
applied to investigate whether (and when) the move from
Yahoo! is relevant. Some papers have studied search engines
optimal ranking strategies, see for instance [6], [7]. In [6],
a comparison is made between a deterministic allocation
based on GSP and a random assignment rule based on VCG.
Deterministic allocation will produce a higher revenue for
search engines but a lower utility for advertisers; it is argued
that under competition, random allocation could eventually be
the winner if advertisers have to choose. In [7], a game is
applied between two search engines on the ranking policy
(choosing between revenue-based and bid-based), given that
advertisers choose to submit their ad at only one of them. A
conclusion gives a potential reason explaining why Yahoo! has
made the move. Though, the paper is based on the assumption
that advertisers necessarily choose among the two engines.
A practical justification of this could be based on budget
constraints, but those are not included in the model of [7]. If
advertisers bid truthfully and are sure that bidding is always
beneficial, why not sending bids to both engines? We aim at
investigating the best ranking strategy of search engines in
that case. Actually, here the choice of a search engine does
not have an influence on the other. Therefore the analysis can
be performed by looking at an engine in isolation. The best
strategy will depend on the engine parameters, such that its
CTRs which can vary due to different presentations and be
more or less attractive to the (heterogeneous) population.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the basic model, mostly inspired from [7]. Section III
gives a closed-form expression for the average revenue of the
search engine in terms of the probability distribution of the
advertisers’ valuation and the CTRs, for each engine strategy
(bid-based and revenue-based). Section IV illustrates the kind
of results that can be obtained by deriving the expression for
a specific valuation distribution, namely the uniform one. A
numerical comparison of the revenue is then performed in
terms of the CTRs. Finally, Section V concludes and gives
some directions for future research.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We assume that a set of n advertisers submit bids to search
engines for a given keyword. Bidders (advertisers) are assumed
to be truthful about their valuation, and providers are assumed
to apply Pay-Per-Click and GSP, so that submitting to all
engines at the same time is the best option for advertisers
(they will always end-up with a non-negative utility). As a
consequence, search engines revenues are independent of the
ranking-rule of competitors. The best strategy of an engine
therefore only depends on its own choice. As a consequence,
we consider a single engine in this paper, and compare the
revenue when bid-based or revenue-based mechanisms are
implemented, depending on the CTRs of advertisers. As we
shall see, two engines may have different optimal strategies
when the CTRs of advertisers differ from an engine to another.
Since our goal is to illustrate that phenomenon, we consider
only one slot. As a side effect, GSP corresponds to VCG and
truthful-bidding (i.e., bidding one’s real valuation for a click on
one’s ad) is the optimal strategy for advertisers. In that context,
consider n advertisers with respective bids (vi)i∈{1,...,n} and
CTRs (qi)i∈{1,...,n}.
• A bid-based Pay-Per-Click GSP mechanism consists in
giving the slot to the highest bidder ib := arg maxi vi,
and charging him the second-highest bid maxi 6=ib vi
at each click, hence yielding an expected revenue
qib maxi 6=ib vi.
• On the other hand, a revenue-based Pay-Per-Click GSP
mechanism would give the slot to the bidder with the
largest product bid×CTR, i.e., to the advertiser ir :=
arg maxi qivi. Then bidder ir would be charged at each
click the lowest price pir he could have bid while still
getting the slot: pir =
1
qir
maxi 6=ir qivi. As a result, the
expected revenue for the seach engine would be qirpir =
maxi 6=ir qivi.
To compare quantitatively the performance of both schemes,
we consider a model definition similar to the one in [7]. Specif-
ically, we assume that there are two classes of advertisers:
• high-quality advertisers, with CTR qh
• low-quality advertisers, with CTR ql, such that ql < qh.
The probability of being a high quality one is denoted by
α. Advertisers also have different valuation per click v,
distributed according to an absolutely continuous pdf F and
density f , independent of the quality.
III. AVERAGE REVENUES
Remark that when considering specific instances, revenue-
based ranking does not necessarily produce a larger revenue
than bid-based one. Consider for instance n = 2 advertisers,
where advertiser 1 has valuation v1 = 0.7 and CTR qh = 0.6,
and advertiser 2 has valuation v2 = 0.5 and CTR ql = 0.1.
In that case, with bid-based ranking rule, advertiser 1 is the
winner, and the revenue will be v2qh = 0.3. With revenue-
based ranking rule, v1qh > v2ql so advertiser 1 is still the
winner, but the price per click is v2ql/qh and the generated
revenue is v2ql = 0.05, less than with the bid-based strategy.
The intuition is that the second-ranked bidder may be a low-
quality advertiser, resuting in smaller price per click when
using the revenue-based scheme. Note though that this is less
likely to occur when the number of bidders increases.
In this section, we intend to quantify the prevalence and
the expected impact of such situations, so as to determine the
best revenue-making strategy. To do so, we derive closed-form
expressions of revenues for both ranking strategies.
Proposition 1: The average revenue under bid-based rank-
ing and charging is
Rb = n(n−1)(αqh+(1−α)ql)
∫
x(F (x))n−2(1−F (x))f(x)dx.
Proof: Thanks to the independence of valuation and
quality, the average revenue under Pay-Per-Click and GSP is
the product of the average CTR and the average value of the
second highest bid. The average CTR is αqh + (1− α)ql.
The expected value of the second highest bid is determined
from the law of order statistics. It is known that the density
value of the k-th statistic X(k), when ordered in a increasing
order, within a sample of n independent random variables of
density f and cdf F is (see [8])
fX(k)(x) =
n!
(k − 1)! (n− k)!
(F (x))k−1(1− F (x))n−kf(x).
(1)
Then the density of the second highest bid is (for k = n− 1)
n!
(n− 2)!
(F (x))n−2(1− F (x))f(x).
The proposition immediately follows.
Proposition 2: Define
G(x) = αF (x/qh) + (1− α)F (x/ql)
g(x) =
α
qh
f(x/qh) +
1− α
ql
f(x/ql).
The average revenue under revenue-based ranking and charg-
ing is
Rr = n(n− 1)
∫
x(G(x))n−2(1−G(x))g(x)dx.
Proof: The expected revenue under the revenue-based rule
is the expected value of Q× V , with Q the random value of
the CTR and V the random valuation. Let G be the cdf of
QV . We have
G(x) = P[QV ≤ x]
= αF (x/qh) + (1− α)F (x/ql).
The corresponding density is
g(x) =
α
qh
f(x/qh) +
1− α
ql
f(x/ql).
From (1), the density of the second largest value of QV is
n!
(n− 2)!
(G(x))n−2(1−G(x))g(x),
hence the proposition.
The expressions in Propositions 1 and 2 are quite different,
and difficult to compare in the general case. Nevertheless, we
can remark that both are equal when there is no heterogeneity
in CTRs, i.e., when α = 0 or α = 1. This was to be expected,
since when all advertisers have the same CTR q the bid-based
and revenue-based rankings are equivalent: for any bid profile,
we have ib = ir, and the expected revenue of both schemes
are the same: qmaxi 6=ib vi = maxi 6=ir qvi.
To study the case when there is heterogeneity among
advertisers in terms of CTR, we consider a given distribution
of valuations in the next section.
IV. EXAMPLE AND NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
Section III has provided general results. We analyze here
how computations can be performed for a specific valua-
tion cdf. We consider a uniform distribution over [0, 1], i.e.,
F (x) = x for x ∈ [0, 1].
In this case, under the bid-based strategy,
Rb = n(n− 1)(αqh + (1− α)ql)
∫ 1
0
xn−1(1− x)dx
= n(n− 1)(αqh + (1− α)ql)
[
1
n
−
1
n+ 1
]
=
n− 1
n+ 1
(αqh + (1− α)ql).
Under the revenue-based strategy, first remark that ∀x ≥ 0,
G(x) = αmin(1, x/qh) + (1− α) min(1, x/ql).
Define β = α
qh
+ 1−α
ql
and γ = α
qh
. The revenue can be
expressed by decomposing the interval into three subintervals
[0, ql], [ql, qh] and [qh, 1] as
Rr = n(n− 1)
∫ ql
0
x (βx)
n−2
(1− βx)βdx
+n(n− 1)
∫ qh
ql
x(γx+ 1− α)n−2(α− γx)γdx
+0.
Remark that the third line is obtained due to a null derivative
on this interval. The two integrals can be computed; the first
one yields
n(n− 1)βn−1qnl
(
1
n
−
βql
n+ 1
)
,
and the second one gives by multiple integration by part
n
ˆ
(γqh + 1− α)
n−1(αqh − γq
2
h)− (γql + 1− α)
n−1(αql − γq
2
l )
˜
−
1
γ
[(γqh + 1− α)
n(α− 2γqh)− (γql + 1− α)
n(α− 2γql)]
−
2
(n + 1)γ
ˆ
(γqh + 1− α)
n+1
− (γql + 1− α)
n+1
˜
.
Next figures illustrate the gain for specific parameters.
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Figure 1: Revenues in terms of α for different values of ql,
qh, when n = 5.
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Figure 2: Revenues in terms of α for different values of n
when ql = 0.1, qh = 0.7.
Figure 1 displays the revenue in terms of the proportion
α of high-quality users for different CTR values. Here one
can check that for low values of α, and low values of ql,
the bid-based ranking rule may produce a larger revenue than
the revenue-based one. On all the curves, when α ∈ {0, 1},
it can be verified that revenues are the same. Revenues
also (obviously) increase with the proportion of high-quality
advertisers, and with the CTRs.
Figure 2 displays the revenue in terms of the number n of
advertisers for different CTR values. For a small number of
advertisers the chances to get a larger revenue with bid-based
ranking is larger. It is actually the case here when n = 2 for
every value of α. But as the number of advertisers increases,
this is less likely. This is due to the fact that we have more
chances to have a high-quality advertiser in second position
with the revenue-based rule, while the probability α of having
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Figure 3: Revenues in terms of n for different values of ql,
qh, when α = 0.5.
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Figure 4: Revenues in terms of ql, qh when n = 10 and α =
0.5.
a high-quality advertiser with the bid-based rule is unchanged.
As displayed in Figure 2, for n = 200 advertisers the revenue-
based mechanism always outperforms the bid-based one.
Figure 3 displays the revenue in terms of the number n
of advertisers for different CTR values. As the number of
advertisers increase, here again, revenue-based rule yields a
larger revenue. Moreover, the average revenue asymptotically
depends on the high-quality advertisers parameters with this
rule (the two curves tend to coincide) because the second
ranked advertisers tend to be a high-quality one. On the other
hand, this is not true for bid-based ranking rule because the
valuation is independent of the quality parameter.
Figure 4 displays the revenues in terms of ql, qh when n =
10 and α = 0.5. On this 3D curve, we have only considered
the cases where qh > ql (revenues set to 0 otherwise). As a
remark, bid-based and revenue-based get closer as qh and ql
get closer, and are the same when ql = qh. Indeed, those two
schemes are exactly the same in that case.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated in this paper the best strategy between
revenue-based and bid-based rankings for search engines. This
had already been studied in the literature when engines are in
competition, but under the assumption that advertisers choose
only one engine, an assumption that has not been justified.
If we relax this assumption, then search engines can be
considered in isolation (the strategy of the competitors does
not have an influence on the revenue). We show here that
under randomness over advertisers’ valuation and CTRs, the
best strategy is not always to apply revenue-based ranking and
charging: it actually depends on the various parameters. We
derive closed-form expressions for the expected revenues of
both revenue-based and bid-based schemes. As an output, a
search engine is able to decide, according to the advertisers
parameters and reactions to the engine, the best strategy
between the two choices.
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